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I. INTRODUCTION

In Sanchez-Llamasv. Oregon,' a 2006 case involving a treaty, the Supreme
Court of the United States made the following statement: "where a treaty does
not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the2
federal courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own.",
The proposition asserted in this sentence-that a particular remedy is required
for a treaty violation only if specified in the treaty itself-involves a departure
from two hundred years of Supreme Court case law on remedies for a treaty
violation. Treaties are to be enforced by the courts under the Constitution's
Supremacy Clause. 3 The approach the Court takes towards treaties in SanchezLlamas would mean a virtual gutting of the treaty provision of the Supremacy
Clause.
The Court gave little indication of the reasoning that led it to such a narrow
view of required remedies for a treaty breach. It cited no precedents and no
sources in treaty law or in general international law. Fourjustices, dissenting,
challenged the Court on the point.4 They referred to prior cases of treaty
breach in which the Court gave a remedy, even though none was specified in
the particular treaty. 5 The dissenters thus viewed the Court's approach as
inconsistent with its own case law.6 The dissenters did not, however, analyze
the issue of remedy for a treaty breach, and hence did not explain why they
thought the Court to be wrong.
The Court, in fact, is quite wrong in saying that only a remedy specifically
expressed in a treaty need be given. Remedies are required in case of treaty
breach, but rarely are they specified in the treaty itself. A separate branch of
international law, which serves as an adjunct to treaty law, provides for
remedies. 7 It was by ignoring this branch of international law that the Court
fell into error. This Article examines both the Supreme Court's precedents on
remedies for treaty breach and the relevant international law. It suggests an

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
2 Id. at 2680.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Id. at 2694-98. Breyer, Stevens and Souter ascribed to the entire dissent. Id. at 2690.
Ginsburg joined Part II of the dissent, which is the portion of the dissent to which this Article
relates. Id.
' Id. at 2696.
6 Id. at 2696.
' See discussion infra Part V.
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approach consistent with the Court's prior cases, and with international law,
that should be followed in cases of treaty breach.
II. BACKGROUND TO SANCHEZ-LLAMAS V. OREGON
The treaty provision at issue in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon was Article 36
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).8 That provision
imposes obligations on a state (in the sense of nation state) whose authorities
arrest a foreign national.9 One of the most widely ratified treaties, with 171
states as parties, the VCCR was ratified by the United States in 1969.0 For
domestic law purposes, this ratification calls into play the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution, which requires the courts to regard treaties
as law." As construed and implemented by the United States Supreme Court,
the Supremacy Clause means that if a treaty provides a right to a given
category of persons, the courts will enforce that right for anyone falling into
that category. 2
The idea underlying VCCR Article 36 is that a nation state, as represented
by its consuls, may communicate with any of its nationals who happen to be
in the other state, including those under arrest. 3 Article 36 provides a right for
a consul to communicate with an arrested national, and a reciprocal right for
the arrested national to communicate with the consul. 4 Further, and
importantly, Article 36 gives the national a right to be informed of the right of
access to the consul. 5 If the foreign national opts for consular access, the

' Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
9Id.
" See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, availableat http://untreaty.un.org/english/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/
chapterIlIltreaty31 .asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
2 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 199 (1796); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253
(1829).
13LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 133 (2d ed. 1991).
" VCCR, supra note 8, art. 36(1)(a).
15Id. art. 36(l)(b).
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authorities must, at the national's option, themselves contact the consul, or
allow the national to do so.16
A consul, once notified, may assist the foreign national in a variety of ways;
for example, by ensuring that the national is being treated properly by the
arresting authorities 7 or by explaining the rights of an arrested person in a
fashion, and perhaps in a language, that will be better understood than the
explanation that may be given by police or by a local attorney.' 8 A consul may
advise the national on the local system for criminal representation. 9 A consul

16 Id. art.

36:

1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of
the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the
sending States shall have the same freedom with respect to
communication with and access to consular officers of the sending
State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State
if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in
any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular
post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall
also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their
district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national
who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes
such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to
the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended.
1"7 DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAiRs MANUAL § 423.10 (2004) (suggesting that a consul
take photographs ofrecently arrested U.S. nationals in case the person is subsequently physically
abused), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86605.pdf.
18 Id. § 415.3.
19 Id.
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may suggest names of attorneys who, in the past, have represented persons of
the particular nationality. 20 A consul who considers that the national's rights
are being violated may file a protest with the local authorities.2 '
Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican, was arrested in Oregon and informed of his
Miranda rights, but was not informed of his right to contact a consul of
Mexico. 22 This failure was in violation of Article 36, a violation that is not
disputed. 23 Police proceeded to interrogate Sanchez-Llamas shortly after
arresting him and elicited a statement from him containing incriminating
elements.24 Sanchez-Llamas was charged with attempted murder. Prior to
trial, he filed a motion to suppress the statement, on grounds of the authorities'
failure to comply with Article 36.26 The motion was denied. Sanchez-Llamas
was convicted at trial and sentenced to "twenty and one-half" years in prison.27
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. 28 Sanchez-Llamas sought
review by way of certiorariin29the Supreme Court of the United States, which
accepted the case for review.
The Supreme Court of the United States left the conviction in place.3" In
its decision, the Court avoided a broader question that had been contested
below as to whether Article 36 provides a right that a court must implement for
a foreign national.31 Instead, the Court focused on the remedy sought by
Sanchez-Llamas, suppression, posing for itself the question of whether
suppression is required when a statement is elicited from a foreign national
who was not informed of the right to contact a consul.32 As recounted by the
Court:
Sanchez-Llamas argues that the trial court was required to
suppress his statements to police because authorities never told

20 Id. §§ 415.4, 423.4.
21 Id. § 426.1.
22 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,

126 S. Ct. 2669, 2676 (2006).

23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id
27

Id.
Id.

21

State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005).

26

29 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 1001 (2005).
30 126 S. Ct. at 2688 (affirming decision of Supreme Court of Oregon).

1 Id. at 2677-78 (indicating that the Court will assume, without deciding, that VCCR
Art. 36 granted enforceable rights to Sanchez-Llamas).
32 Id. at 2678.
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him of his rights under Article 36. He refrains, however, from
arguing that the Vienna Convention itself mandates suppression.
We think this a wise concession. The Convention does not
prescribe specific remedies for violations of Article 36. Rather,
it expressly leaves the implementation of Article 36 to domestic
law: Rights under Article 36 are to "be exercised in conformity
with the laws and regulations of the receiving State." As far as
the text of the Convention is concerned, the question of the
rule for Article 36 violations is a
availability of the exclusionary
33
matter of domestic law.
The Court went on to ask itself whether suppression was required as a
matter of domestic law and decided that it was not.34 Then it reverted to the
question of whether a remedy was required on the basis of the VCCR or any
emanation from it.35 The Court said:
[O]ur authority to create a judicial remedy applicable in state
court 6 must lie, if anywhere, in the treaty itself.... If we were
to require suppression for article 36 violations without some
authority in the Convention, we would in effect be supplementing
those terms by enlarging the obligations of the United States
under the Convention. This is entirely inconsistent with the
judicial function. Cf The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 71
(1821) (Story, J.) ("[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by
inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or trivial,
would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise
of judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a
treaty").37

3 Id. (citation omitted).
14 Id. at 2679.
35 Id.
36 The Court did not speculate whether a different analysis would apply if Sanchez-Llamas
had been prosecuted federally.
37 126 S. Ct. at 2679.
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The Court said that a self-executing treaty binds states, like Oregon, under
the Supremacy Clause, and that:
[Wlhere a treaty provides for a particular judicial remedy, there
is no issue of intruding on the constitutional prerogatives of the
States or the other federal branches. Courts must apply the
remedy as a requirement of federal law.... But where a treaty
does not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or
implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on the
States through lawmaking of their own.3"
HI.

THE DISSENT

The Court's four dissenters disputed the proposition that a court cannot
impose a remedy when the treaty is silent on the issue. 39 They responded to
the majority by saying that the Court has often provided a remedy for a treaty
violation, even absent specification of a remedy in the treaty itself: "[T]his
Court has routinely permitted individuals to enforce treaty provisions similar
to Article 36 in domestic judicial proceedings."40
The dissenters cited three cases in which the Court had provided a remedy
for violation of a treaty where the treaty itself contained no language about a
remedy.4 United States v. Rauscher42 involved an extradition treaty, which,
as construed by the Court, allowed the requesting state to prosecute only for
the offense on which it requested extradition. 3 Rauscher was extradited to the
United States on one offense, but then the prosecution characterized the crime
differently and made it the subject of a different offense." The extradition
treaty said nothing about any right for the extraditee in that situation, limiting
itself rather to the obligation of the requesting state not to charge any different
offense.45 Since the treaty did not mention any right for the extraditee, it

38

Id.at 2680.

31 Id. at 2693-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40

Id. at 2696.

41 Id.
42 119

U.S. 407 (1886).

43 Id. at 419.
" Id. at 409 (stating that Rauscher was extradited on the charge of murder, but was charged

with the lesser offense of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on another crew member of
his vessel on the high seas).
41 Id.at410-11.
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mentioned no remedy for the extraditee.46 Nonetheless, when Rauscher
challenged the additional charge, the Court gave him a remedy by ruling that
the additional charge could not be laid. 7
Kolovrat v. Oregon48 involved a provision in a U.S.-Serbia treaty that
entitled Serb nationals to inherit personal property on par with U.S. nationals.49
Oregon, by statute, permitted foreigners to inherit only if it appeared that a
U.S. national would, in like circumstances, be entitled to inherit under the law
of the other country.5" On the basis of that statute the Oregon Supreme Court
refused to let the foreigners inherit.5 In the view of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the Oregon statute, as applied to these foreigners, was
inconsistent with the treaty.52 Even though the treaty said nothing about
remedy, the Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court and ordered that the
property in question go to the foreigners. 3
Asakura v. Seattle involved a Seattle ordinance forbidding foreigners to be
pawnbrokers.5 4 Asakura, a Japanese national who was engaged in
pawnbroking in Seattle when the ordinance was adopted, sued Seattle to
restrain it from enforcing the ordinance against him.55 A treaty with Japan
gave Japanese citizens a right to carry on trade in the United States on par with
U.S. nationals.56 The Court ruled that the treaty right prevailed over the
ordinance, so that the ordinance could not be enforced against a Japanese
national.57 The treaty contained no provision about remedy.5" Nonetheless, the
Court provided Asakura a remedy by ruling that the ordinance could not be
enforced against him.5 9
In all three of these cases, a treaty provided a right but was silent as to a
remedy. In each case the Court provided a remedy. In none of the three did
the Court feel the need to engage in any analysis, like that in which the Court

46

Id.

41 Id. at

432-33.

48 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
49 Id. at 191.
50
'

52

Id. at 188 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1951)).
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 196.

5 Id. at 198.
14 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
" Id. at 340.
56 Id.
17 Id. at 343.
51 Id. at 340.
'9 Id. at 343-44.
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engaged in Sanchez-Llamas, as to whether the remedy was to be found in
domestic law or in international law. In each of the three cases, the Court
appeared to view it as axiomatic that if a treaty provided a right, the Court
must provide a remedy.60
In Sanchez-Llamas, the Court did not refer to any of these three cases, or
to any prior cases on remedy for a treaty violation. It is thus not clear whether
the Court meant to depart from these prior cases or whether it simply
overlooked them.
The dissenters, curiously, did not challenge the Court on its citation to The
Amiable Isabella.6 The Court did not, in its quotation from that case, indicate
what was at issue there.62 Had the Court done so, the quotation's irrelevance
would have been obvious. The Amiable Isabella does not stand for the
proposition that a court may not devise an appropriate remedy for a treaty
violation. The issue in The Amiable Isabellawas whether the Court could add
terms to a treaty that imposed obligations on the parties when the treaty itself
failed to indicate those terms.63
The United States and Spain, as parties to a bilateral treaty, had specified
that a document was to be appended to the treaty as an annex, but, for
unknown reasons, they signed the treaty without including any annex.' The
question was whether the Court could, in effect, compose the annex or assume
what its contents were to have been. 65 The Court said it could not, and it was
in that context that the Court made the statement quoted in Sanchez-Llamas
that a court is not free to insert a clause.66 The clause about which the Court
was speaking in The Amiable Isabella would have imposed on the parties
obligations in addition to those found in the treaty.67 These additional
obligations led the Court in The Amiable Isabellato say that it was not open
to it ;llas a court to insert a clause.68

60 Id. at 343; United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,432 (1886); Kolovratv. Oregon, 366
U.S. 187, 196 (1961).
61 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
62 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2679 (2006) (quoting In re The Amiable

Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821)).
63 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 71.
64
65
66
67

Id. at 70.
Id. at 70-71.
Sanchez-Llamas, 126. S. Ct. at 2679.
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 71.

68 Id.
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The dissenters have the more correct view on remedy for a treaty violation,
a view consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Their view is also correct as
a matter of the law of treaties and the law of remedies for a violation of a treaty
obligation. The dissenters did not, however, explain why the Court was
wrong. As will be explained in the next section, when a court provides a
remedy for a violation of a treaty provision, it is not "inserting a clause," but
rather is implementing the obligation that was not respected.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON REMEDY FOR A TREATY VIOLATION

The Court was wrong to say that VCCR Article 36 leaves the remedy to
domestic law. The Court incorrectly cited Article 36, paragraph 2 to reach that
conclusion. That paragraph does say, as the Court quotes, that a foreign
national's rights are to "be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State."'6 9 That statement is merely a recognition
that a foreign national will raise a consular access violation within whatever
rules are provided in domestic law to do so. The paragraph also says, as a
limitation on the language the Court cited, that even though the matter will be
handled under domestic law, "full effect" must be given to the national's
rights.7" In other words, it is not permissible to invoke rules of domestic law
that would defeat the national's rights.
Moreover, regardless of the wording of VCCR Article 36, paragraph 2, the
question of remedy for a treaty violation is a matter of international law. The
Court's essential error in Sanchez-Llamas was that it ignored that fact.
Treaties typically do not address remedies. 7' Like domestic contracts, they
set out the obligations of the parties. Like domestic contracts, they do not
typically spell out the consequences of any breach that might occur. In the
domestic law of contract, if a contract calls for a seller to deliver an item, for
which the buyer is to pay, the contract need not specify that a failure to pay
will require return of the item, or of equivalent value.72 That proposition is
found in a body of law relating to remedies, and a remedy will be provided
73
even though none is specified in the contract.
69

VCCR, supra note 8, art. 36(2).

70 Id.

71LORD ARNoLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 574 (1961) (stating, in regard to right to
reparation for a treaty violation, "[I]t is not necessary that the treaty alleged to be broken...
should refer to reparation").
72 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcTs 784 (3d ed. 1999).
73Id.
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Treaties, similarly, prescribe obligations.74 Only rarely do they address
remedy. The basis for a remedy for a treaty violation, and this applies to a
violation of VCCR Article 36, is found outside the text of the treaty.
V. THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
In international law the rules on remedy for a treaty violation are found in
a body of law known as the law of state responsibility.75 It is that body of law
76
that deals with general issues of a state's liability for violating its obligations.
Whenever a state violates an international obligation, whether the obligation
is found in the customary law of nations, in a multilateral treaty, or in a
bilateral treaty, it must make amends.77 Without this secondary body of law,
treaty obligations would be meaningless, as there would be no remedy.78
Hence, when the Supremacy Clause calls on courts to apply treaties as law,
that injunction includes not only the treaty's terms, which typically relate only
to obligations, but the law of international remedies, which operates as an
adjunct to treaty law.79
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has applied the law of state
responsibility to find appropriate remedies for treaty breach. For example, in
a 1997 case, Czechoslovakia and Hungary had agreed jointly to build
waterworks on the Danube River in a bilateral treaty that obligated each to
undertake certain aspects of construction and water diversion. 0 At a certain
point, the arrangement went sour. One side, then the other, found reasons not
to fulfill its obligations." The treaty was silent on the consequences of a
breach, whether the other party might be entitled to denounce the treaty, or to
suspend its own performance. 2 The ICJ explained that the circumstances that
might constitute breach are dealt with in an international body of law on

71 McNAIR, supra note 71, at 4 (defining a treaty as a document that creates a relation
between states).
71 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 435 (5th ed. 1998).
76Id.
77 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILTY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 83 (2002).
71 Id. at 16.
79 Id.
80

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter

Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject].
81 Id. at 25.
82 Id. at 62.
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treaties, and that the consequences of breach are found in the law of state
responsibility.83
Addressing what might occur if a party to a bilateral treaty suspended
performance before completion of its obligations, the court said that:
[a]n evaluation of the extent to which the suspension or
denunciation of a convention, seen as incompatible with the law
of treaties, involves the responsibility of the State which
proceeded to it, is to be made under the law of State
responsibility.... It is moreover well established that, when a
State has committed an internationally wrongful act, its
international responsibility is likely to be involved whatever the
nature of the obligation it has failed to respect.84
Thus, the issue of the consequences of breach is determined by the law of state
responsibility, and that body of law calls for amends of some kind. In the
ICJ's view, a state that violates a treaty obligation must take appropriate action
to provide a remedy.8 5
The ICJ referred to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,8 6 a
widely ratified treaty that deals with conclusion and performance of treaties,
much in the way the domestic law of contracts provides a framework for
individual contracts.8 7 The court said that that Convention did not, however,
deal with the consequences of a breach, but that a state in breach is nonetheless
obliged to assume responsibility:
Thus the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties
confines itself to defining - in a limitative manner - the
conditions in which a treaty may lawfully be denounced or
suspended; while the effects of a denunciation or suspension seen
as not meeting those conditions are, on the contrary, expressly
excluded from the scope of the Convention by operation of
Article 73 [of that Convention]. It is moreover well established
that, when a State has committed an internationally wrongful act,

83 Id. at 38.
84Id.
85 Id.
86 May23,

1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
87 Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 38 (Sept. 25).
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its international responsibility is likely to be involved whatever
the nature of the obligation it has failed to respect. 88
Many authorities rely on an earlier international case for this proposition,
the Chorzow Factory case, decided in 1928 by the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the predecessor to the International Court of Justice.8 9
In that case the Permanent Court said that where an international obligation is
violated, "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of
the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed." 90
An authoritative statement of the law of state responsibility is found in a
contemporary document drafted by the U.N. International Law Commission
called Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 91 This
document was prepared as articles for a possible multilateral treaty.92 The
International Law Commission is a body created by the U.N. General
Assembly in the 1940s to prepare drafts of multilateral treaties on topics in
international law. 93 The document has not been adopted as a treaty, but the
U.N. General Assembly has urged states to follow it.94 It is widely viewed as
setting out what is regarded by states as the customary international law rules
on the subject.9 5
The Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts document
sets out a hierarchy of remedies. 96 Restoration of the status quo ante is
required if possible in the circumstances. 97 If that is not possible, then
financial compensation is required.98 If financial compensation is not possible,
then "satisfaction" (typically an apology) is required.99 Article 35 addresses
restoration of the status quo ante: "A State responsible for an internationally

88 Id.

89 See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 75, at 437-38.
9'

Chorzow Factory (Indemnity) (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13)

[hereinafter Chorzow Factory].
9"U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Responsibilityof StatesforInternationallyWrongfulActs, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter DraftArticles].
92 See G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
93 REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2002).
9' G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 92.
" See, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 93, at 175-76.
96 Draft Articles, supra note 91, arts. 34-37.
9' Id. art. 35.
98Id. art. 36.
99 Id. art. 37.

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L

[Vol. 36:355

wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, that is, to re-establish
the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed."' 0 The
only exceptions are where restoring the prior situation is "materially
impossible" or where such restoration involves "a burden out of all proportion
to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation." '' Article 36
then specifies, "The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is
under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as
such damage is not made good by restitution."'0 2 Article 37 provides, "The
state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to
give satisfaction for the damage caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made
good by restitution or compensation."'0 3
In situations in which Article 36 of the VCCR is violated, it is often
possible to physically restore the status quo ante, at least in some measure, that
is, if the foreign national was not sentenced to death or, if sentenced to death
has not yet been executed."M If the foreign national has not been executed,
criminal proceedings following the failure to inform at the time of arrest, and
the consequences of those proceedings, can be reversed.' l5 That result would
not fully restore the status quo ante because the person may have been held in
jail for some years. 0 6 Financial compensation may be required for that aspect
of the person's treatment.0 7
The Restatement: ForeignRelations Law of the United States, a document
detailing rules of customary international law, characterizes the law of state
responsibility in terms similar to those used by the ILC. °8 The Restatement
posits:
A state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under
international law resulting from action or inaction by
(a) the government of the state,

'oo Id.art.

35.
1lId. art. 35(a), (b).
102

Id. art. 36.

'03Id.art. 37.
"04See LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466,513-14 (June 27) [hereinafterLaGrand
Case].

105 Id.
106

Id. at 475.

107Draft Articles, supra note 91, art. 36.
100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
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(b) the government or authorities of any political subdivision
of the state, or
(c) any organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent of a
government or of any political subdivision, acting within the
scope of authority or under color of such authority.'09
The Restatement further addresses state responsibility in the context of
violation of the rights of a foreign national:
A state is responsible under international law for injury to a
national of another state caused by an official act or omission that
violates
(a) a human right that... a state is obligated to respect for all
persons subject to its authority;
(b) a personal right that, under international law, a state is
obligated to respect for individuals of foreign nationality;..."'
Finally, the Restatement indicates, in terms similar to those of the ILC, that a
remedy is required whenever a state violates an obligation: "Under
international law, a state that has violated a legal obligation to another state is
required to terminate the violation and, ordinarily, to make reparation,
including in appropriate circumstances restitution or compensation for loss or
injury."'' The Restatement's Reporter cited the Chorzow Factory case 1 2 to
say that restoring the prior existing situation is required. 3
Apart from the question of which remedy is required, a remedy of some sort
is required for a treaty violation, even if the treaty is silent on the issue of
remedy." 4 The Court's error in Sanchez-Llamas was that it disregarded the
fact that the consequences of a treaty violation are covered by the law of state
responsibility, and that when a treaty is violated that body of law calls for a
remedy.

109 Id. § 207.
110 Id. § 711.

" Id.§ 901.
112 Chorzow Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
113 RESTATEMENT, supra note 108, § 901 n.3.
114 See supra notes 75-113 and accompanying text.
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VI. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIOLATION OF CONSULAR ACCESS
The issue of remedy for a violation of the right of consular access has
arisen before two international courts." 5 Each court considered the issue and
gave a decision at odds with the Sanchez-Llamas statement that any remedy to
be given must be found within the provisions of the violated treaty." 6 The two
courts, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the International Court
of Justice, each drew the conclusion that failure to inform a foreign national
of the right of consular access must be remedied." 7 Neither took the view that
it had to find a remedy provision in the VCCR itself.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was asked to issue an advisory
opinion on consular access in the specific context of imposition of capital
punishment on a foreign national. In other words, what consequences follow
if a foreign national is not notified about consular access upon arrest but is
then convicted and sentenced to death?'
The Court decided that the
imposition of a death sentence without compliance with the obligation to
inform detainees of the right of consular access constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of life, hence a violation of the foreign national's human rights.' '9
In a concluding paragraph, the Court addressed the question of remedy:
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that
nonobservance of a detained foreign national's right to
information, recognized in Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, is prejudicial to the
guarantees of the due process of law; in such circumstances,
imposition of the death penalty is a violation of the right not to be
"arbitrarily" deprived of one's life, in the terms of the relevant
provisions of the human rights treaties (eg the American
Convention on Human Rights, Article 4; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6) with the
juridical consequences inherent in a violation of this nature, i.e.,
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of
Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (Oct. 1, 1999)
[hereinafter Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion]; LaGrandCase, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
116 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion, supranote 115; LaGrandCase,2001 I.C.J. at 514.
17 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion, supranote 115,
137; LaGrandCase, 2001 I.C.J.
at 514.
118 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Advisory Opinion, supra note 115,
1.
115

19

Id.

137.

2008]

MUST TREATY VIOLATIONS BE REMEDIED?

responsibility of the State
those pertaining to the international
21
reparations.
make
to
duty
and the
The Inter-American Court thus referred to the law of state responsibility as the
source for a requirement of remedy. 2' The "juridical consequence" of a
violation was an22obligation to make reparations, as required by the law of state
responsibility.1
The International Court of Justice similarly found a remedy to be required
in the event of a consular access violation. 23 Germany had sued the United
States, seeking an order against the pending execution of a German national
who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Arizona. 24 The
German national had not been informed upon arrest of the right of consular
access.' 2 5 The United States admitted the violation of the obligation to notify
the national but said that the violation did not preclude executing him.2 6 The
violation by apologizing to
United States argued that it could remedy the
27 The court rejected that position. 28
Germany.
The Court addressed the issue of remedy in the broader context of German
nationals who might be arrested in the United States. 29 The Court said:
[I]f the United States... should fail in its obligation of consular
notification to the detriment of German nationals, an apology
would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned have
been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced
to severe penalties. In the case of such a conviction and
sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow
the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by
taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention. 3 0

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.

123 LaGrandCase, 2001
124 Id. at 472.
125 Id. at 473.
126

Id.

Id.
1I Id. at 515-16.
127

129 Id. at
130

Id.

513-14.

I.C.J. 466, 515-16 (June 27).
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The Court thus was employing the1 law of state responsibility in calling for
13
restoration of the status quo ante.
VII. VIEWS OF STATES PARTY TO THE

VCCR

Many states that are party to the VCCR have said, consistent with these
decisions, that a remedy is required in response to a violation of VCCR
Article 36.132 In an earlier VCCR case in the United States Supreme Court, the
European Union and the Council of Europe, together representing forty-six
European nations, all of whom have ratified the VCCR, filed an amicus curiae
brief asking the Court to provide a remedy in accordance with the ICJ opinion
in LaGrand.3 In regard to treaties, the practice of ratifying states is viewed
as relevant on issues of interpretation. 134 The fact that so many states party to
the VCCR view a remedy35 as being required is strong evidence that the treaty
does in fact require one.
One of the few cases to reach the highest court of a state party to the VCCR
was decided only a few months after Sanchez-Llamas by the German
Constitutional Court. 36 The German court ruled that when consular access is
violated and a foreign national is convicted, the conviction must be
reviewed.' 37 As to the suppression of a statement made by a foreign national
who was not informed about consular access, the German court said that
Article 36 is a first line of defense for foreign nationals in regard to their
normally weaker legal and psychological position in comparison to natives.'38
In Australia, no case has reached the highest court. However, two cases
have reached the highest courts of Australia's federative states.139 In one case,

"'1 Id. at 514.
132

Brief for the European Union and Members of the International Community as Amici

Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8-9, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928),
2005 WL 152924.
133 Id.
' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 86, art. 3 1(3)(b).
135WALLACE, supra note 93, at 16-19.
136 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 19, 2006, 2
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 2115/01 (F.R.G.), availableathttp://
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20060919_2bvr211501 .html.
137 Id. 68.
138 Id. 74.
139Tan Seng Kiah v. Queen (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26 (Austl.); Queen v. Kok Cheng Tan (2001)
W.A.R. 275 (Austl.).
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a Singapore national was convicted of importing heroin into Australia. 40 After
being arrested, he asked for access to the Consular Office of Singapore.'4 1 The
authorities did nothing to facilitate access. 4 2 Instead, they interrogated him,
eliciting a statement that in the prosecution's view contained lies which
suggested guilt. 43 The statement was not a confession, however.'"
The Court explained that the Australian statutory provision implementing
Article 36141 was silent as to a remedy in the event that the authorities failed
to comply with consular access. 46 The Court said, however:
Contacting the consular office by a detained foreign national
provides an opportunity to report his or her circumstances, seek
advice and assistance, provides a means of informing relatives
and friends of his or her situation and all this in his or her native
language. One need only contemplate the predicament of an
Australian national held in custody in a foreign non-English
speaking country without access to an Australian consular office
to appreciate the importance of the right contained in s 23P of the
1
Crimes Act.

47

The Court said that, although the authorities did not apply pressure to gain a
statement, "[t]he fact remains that he may not have agreed to be interviewed
or the interview may have followed a different path had the applicant been
dealt with in compliance with the provisions of the Crimes Act."' 48 The Court
concluded that "the proper exercise of the discretion" required exclusion of the
statement.1 49 The Court viewed suppression as required even though neither

14'

Tan Seng Kiah (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26. The Northern Territory is a federal territory rather

than a state. Its highest court occupies a place comparable to that of the highest court of a state.
141 Id. 47. He also asked to see an attorney.
142 Id. 48. The authorities similarly did not facilitate access to an attorney.
143Id. 69.
144Id.
145

Australia, which has no constitutional provision comparable to the Supremacy Clause of

the U.S. Constitution, incorporates treaty provisions into domestic law by statute. See Crimes
Act, 1914, § 23P (Austl.), discussed infra note 157.
146 Tan Seng Kiah (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26,
55.
147 Id. 49.
148 Id. 66.
149Id. 72. The decision to exclude was based both on the failure to afford access both to
a consul and to an attorney. Id.
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Article 36 nor the Australian implementing law mentions suppression or other
remedies. 50
In the other Australian case, the issue was suppression of narcotics seized
from a travel bag of a Japanese national who was being detained in a fashion
that implicated Article 36.' The authorities had not informed the man of his
right to contact a consul. 52 The Court suppressed the narcotics on the sole
ground that the detention was unlawful because of the authorities' failure to
53
inform the national about his right to consular access.
In Sanchez-Llamas,the Court acknowledged the Australian cases, 5 4 and the
dissenters relied on the Tan Seng Kiah case.' The Court dismissed the two
cases as having been decided on the basis of an Australian statute "that
provides rights beyond those required by Article 36 itself."' 5 6 The Court's
dismissal of the two cases is questionable, however. The Court did not explain
why it thought the Australian statute goes beyond what is required by
Article 36. One may imagine that it is because the Australian statute
specifically requires that the foreign national be informed about consular
access prior to any interrogation.' 57 Article 36 does not in terms do so. But the

150Id.

Queen v. Kok Cheng Tan (2001) W.A.R. 275 (Austl.).
'52
Id. Breyer, in dissent, characterized this case as an "Australian case considering but
declining to suppress evidence based on [a] violation of [the] same statute." Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2707 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the evidence in
question was the narcotics found in the travel bag, which the court did in fact suppress.
...Kok Cheng Tan (2001) W.A.R. 275, 59.
114 126 S.Ct. at 2678 n.3.
155 Id. at 2707.
156 Id. at 2678 n.3.
157 Crimes Act, 1914, § 23P (Austl.). This provision as amended in 1991, read as follows at
the time of the two cases:
23P. (1) Subject to section 23L [which allows for departure in case of
specified exigent circumstances] if a person under arrest for a Commonwealth
offence is not an Australian citizen, the investigating official holding the
person under arrest must, before starting to question the person:
(a) inform the person that he or she may communicate with or attempt
to communicate with, the consular office of the country of which the person
is a citizen; and
(b) defer the questioning for a reasonable time to allow the person to
make, or attempt to make, the communication.
(2) Subject to section 23L, if the person wishes to communicate with a
consular office, the investigating official holding the person under arrest must,
as soon as practicable, give the person reasonable facilities to do so.
In late 2001, the above language was repealed and replaced as follows:
151
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Australian provision was enacted to bring Australian law into conformity with
Article 36, and there is no indication that Australia meant to go beyond
Article 36.58 Rather, it appears that it was the Australian understanding that
the obligation to inform a foreign national required that this be done prior to
interrogating him.'59
In these two cases, the Australian courts were thus presented with the issue
of excluding, in the one instance a statement and in the other material
evidence, for failure to comply with the VCCR's provisions regarding consular

23P. (1) Subject to section 23L, ifa person who is under arrest or a protected
suspect is not an Australian citizen, an investigating official must, as soon as
practicable:
(a) inform the person that if he or she requests that the consular office
of:
(i) the country of which he or she is a citizen; or
(ii) the country to which he or she claims a special connection;
be notified that he or she is under arrest or a protected
suspect (as the case requires), that consular office will be
notified accordingly; and
(b) if the person so requests-notify that consular office accordingly;
and
(c) inform the person that he or she may communicate with, or attempt
to communicate with, that consular office; and
(d) give the person reasonable facilities to do so; and
(e) forward any written communication from the person to that consular
office; and
(f) allow the person a reasonable time to, or to attempt to, communicate
with that consular office.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), an investigating official must
not start to question the person unless paragraphs (1)(c), (d) and
(f) have been complied with.
NEW SOUTH WALES L. REF. COMM'N, REP. No. 66, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POLICE
POWERS OF DETENTION AND INVESTIGATION AFTER ARREST 5.43 (1990), availableat http://
www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R66TOC. Citing the federal Gibbs Committee's Review
of Commonwealth Criminal Law, which made recommendations that led to the adoption of
§ 23P, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission stated,
The Review Committee of Commonwealth Criminal Law has recommended
adoption of this provision [on the right of a foreign national to consular
access] at the federal level. This right derives from Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, brought into force in Australia by the
Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1972.
Id.
159 Id.
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access. 160 Even absent any treaty or statutory provision requiring these
remedies, the two Australian courts regarded the exclusion as required. 6 '
The U.S. Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas Court mentions, as well, that
several amici cited United Kingdom cases. 162 In the UK, no cases have been
decided by higher courts. The reference was evidently to two decisions at the
trial level in which the judge excluded incriminating statements of foreign
because they had not
nationals convicted, in both instances, of drug smuggling
63
1
access.
consular
to
right
been informed of their
The dissenters in Sanchez-Llamas relied, as well, on a trial-level Canadian
In that case, a U.S. national sought to suppress an
case, R v. Partak.I
incriminating statement made to Canadian authorities while he was in custody
and without having been informed of the right to consular access. 165 The court
denied his motion. 66 The Sanchez-Llamas dissenters quote the judge as
having said that his reason for denying suppression was that Partak
"completely failed to demonstrate any prejudice arising from the failure of the
police to notify him of his consular rights."' 67 They therefore read the case as
taking the view that suppression might be appropriate if introduction
prejudiced the foreign national.16
The Court disputed the dissenters' reading of Partak as follows: "The
Canadian case on which the dissent relies . . . denied suppression, and
concerned only the court's general discretionary authority to exclude a
confession 'whose admission would adversely affect the fairness of an
accused's trial.' "'69 The Court thus sought to read Partak as giving no
indication that suppression might ever be required for a consular access
violation. 70 The dissenters have the better reading of the case, however. The
judge's reason for denying suppression is that, as he understood the facts,
Partak was extremely anxious to confess to the murder of which he was

' Tan Seng Kiah v. Queen (2001) 160 F.L.R. 26 (Aust.); Queen v. Kok Cheng Tan (2001)
W.A.R. 275 (Austl.).
161Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2678 n.3.
Id.
163R v. Bassil & Mouffareg, LEGAL ACTION, Dec. 1990, at 23 (Acton Crown Ct. 1990); R
v. Van Axel & Wezer, LEGAL ACTION, Sept. 1991, at 12 (Snaresbrook Crown Ct. 1991).
164[2001] 160 C.C.C.(3d) 553 (Ont.); Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2707.
162

165 Partak,160
166 Id. at 570.

C.C.C.(3d) at 556.

167Sanchez-Llamas,
168 Id.

169Id. at 2678 n.3.
170 Id.

126 S. Ct. at 2707.
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suspected; hence, it would have been unlikely that notifying him about
consular access would have changed how he conducted himself with the
authorities.' 7 '
The Court read the foreign practice as showing no support for the approach
of suppression, primarily on the paucity of court cases in which a statement
' As the dissenters point out,
was suppressed for a consular access violation. 72
however, in civil law systems, pre-trial motions are not typically used, and
decisions about using, or not using, a statement would be made by an
examining magistrate or a trial judge, without a motion having been made.',"
The Court bolsters its refusal to suppress by claiming that suppression is a
remedy used nowhere in the world except in the United States:
It would be startling if the Convention were read to require
suppression. The exclusionary rule as we know it is an entirely
American legal creation. More than 40 years after the drafting
of the Convention, the automatic exclusionary rule applied in our
courts is still "universally rejected" by other countries. 114
Hence, the Court implies that suppression is not used outside the United States,
be contemplated as a remedy for a VCCR
and thus could not 17possibly
5
violation.
36
Article
As indicated, however, a number of foreign courts have used suppression
for a VCCR Article 36 violation. 176 But they use it more generally to remedy
other procedural violations. 77 Contrary to the implication of the Court's
quotation of Professor Bradley, that author does not say that statements are not
suppressed when unlawfully obtained. Bradley in fact says, after reviewing
foreign practice, that evidence often is excluded for having been unlawfully
obtained. 78 What Bradley says has been "universally rejected" is Mapp v.

...Partak, 160 C.C.C.(3d) at 570.
172

Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2678 n.3.

173 Id. at

2707-08.

"I Id. at 2678 (citations omitted) (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 375 (2001)).
175 Id.

76 See supra notes 139-53, 163 and accompanying text.
177

Bradley, supra note 174.

"I Id. at 399.
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Ohio's'79 requirement that unlawfully obtained evidence must in all instances
be excluded.'
VIII. VIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Of course the view of the United States as a party to the VCCR is also
relevant. The Department of State in recent years has argued that no judicial
remedy is required when consular access is violated. 8' In a 1998 case filed
against it in the ICJ by Paraguay, the Department espoused a view quite close
to that of the Court in Sanchez-Llamas) 2 Virginia was about to execute a
Paraguayan convicted of murder, but who had not been informed at the time
of arrest of his right to contact a Paraguayan consul.' 3 In response to
Paraguay's request for an injunctive order to stop the execution, the
Department of State argued to the International Court of Justice:
Paraguay's application maintains that the necessary legal
consequence for any such breach is that the ensuing conviction
and sentence must be put aside. There is absolutely no support
for this claim in the language of the Convention. The Court
should not read into a clear and nearly universal multilateral
instrument such a substantial and potentially disruptive additional
obligation that has no support in the language agreed by the
parties."'
Again focusing on the language of the VCCR, the Department told the ICJ,
"Absolutely nothing in the language of Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (or any other Article of the Convention)
offers support for Paraguay's claim that failure of consumer notification
85
requires invalidation ofany subsequent conviction and sentence of an alien."'

179
180

368 U.S. 871 (1961) (establishing the exclusionary rule).
Bradley, supranote 174, at 399. Bradley acknowledges, in his article, exceptions in our

own case law that make exclusion less than automatic.
...See Oral Arguments on the Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 2000 I.C.J. Pleadings 45 (Apr. 7) [hereinafter
Oral Arguments].
182 Id.
183 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372 (1998).
18 Oral Arguments, supra note 181, at 45.
185 Id. at 44.

2008]

MUST TREATY VIOLATIONS BE REMEDIED?

379

That position was at odds with the position the Department argued when it
found itself on the other side of a VCCR case, namely when U.S. consuls had
been taken hostage in Iran.186 When that occurred, the United States sued Iran
over the hostage-taking and used VCCR Article 36 as a basis for its demand
that Iran release those it held. 18 7 Just as suppression of an incriminating
statement is not mentioned in the VCCR, so too release of consuls held hostage
is not mentioned. Nonetheless, the Department told the ICJ that Article 36
required release. 188 The Department found no obstacle in the fact that such a
remedy is not mentioned in Article 36. It argued that once a situation is
determined to be illegal, the state in breach is under an obligation to bring that
situation to an end.' 89 The ICJ accepted the Department's argument and
ordered Iran to release the hostages.' 90
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Court's broad proposition that in the event of a treaty violation, only
a remedy specified in that treaty need be given would bring a serious erosion
of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause provision on treaties. In the VCCR
context, it also puts the United States in violation of its international
obligation, because it means that U.S. courts will not be giving remedies
required when U.S. authorities fail to comply. The United States should be
providing a remedy when it fails to comply with the VCCR Article 36
obligation. The Court compounded its error as to remedy by misreading
foreign court decisions that called for suppression as a remedy for an
Article 36 violation.
The Court, as indicated, did not explain the reasoning that led it to the
unfortunate position that only remedies specified in a treaty must be used. The
Court was apparently unaware of how remedies work for treaty violations.

186 B. Drummond Aryes, Jr., Ex-hostage, Resting in Maine, Describes Ordeal,N.Y. TIMES,

July 27, 1980, at Al (stating how one of the detained consuls described situation of U.S.
personnel taken hostage and held at U.S. embassy in Tehran).
187 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 6
(May 24) [hereinafter ICJ Decision].
188 Id.

189 Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran), Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1982 I.C.J. Pleadings 188 (Jan. 12).
.90The Department has not offered an explanation of the difference between the view it stated

in 1998 in the Paraguay case, and the view it stated in 1980 in the Iran case. ICJDecision,1980
I.C.J. at 44.
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Once that process is understood, as it hopefully will be in future cases, the
Court should be able to deal properly with treaty violations.

